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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
with decisions in other circuits recognizing an appellate court's inherent
power to grant a party leave to file an untimely motion to rehear. 7 However,
Black does not state upon what grounds a court will grant leave to file an
untimely motion,78 although the principles in other circuits governing grounds
for recall would appear to apply in the Fourth Circuit. 79 The Black court
also showed that the Fourth Circuit is willing to grant leave to file an
untimely motion to rehear without close scrutiny of the reason for untime-
liness.8 0 In holding that section 3161(h)(1)(J) encompasses untimely motions,
however, Black indicates that subsequent untimely motions will be considered
on both the merits of the motion and the absence of dilatory motives.8 The
Black court refused to construe section 3161(h)(1)(J) in a way that would
force courts and prosecutors to choose between an untimely, but sound,
attack on a mandate and imminent dismissal of charges under the Act.82
Instead, the court adopted an approach that has the effect of tying the
section 3161(h)(1)(J) exclusion to the substance of the rehearing motion.83
FRANcis M E SHAFFER
IV. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
A. Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC: EEOC Special
Disclosure Rules-Support or Undermine the Provisions
of Title VII?
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)' established and
77. See 733 F.2d at 351; supra note 53 (listing decisions in which courts allowed late
petition for rehearing after issuance of mandate).
78. See 733 F.2d at 351-352, 352 n.1 (§ 3161(h)(1)(J) excludes any "proceeding," timely
or untimely, from computation of delay allowed under Act).
79. See supra note 53 (citing decisions in other circuits discussing recall of mandate).
80. See 733 F.2d at 351 (citing district court finding in Black that government delayed in
good faith); cf. id. at 352 n.l (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing absence of good grounds for
duplicative filing). But see supra note 42 (under new Fourth Circuit internal procedures,
government attorneys may receive special extension of time in which to file petition for rehearing,
in order to allow Solicitor General to review merits of petition prior to filing).
81. See 733 F.2d at 351 (citing district court finding that government acted in good faith);
cf. id. at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting) (procedural abuse by government mandates dismissal of
indictment to enforce defendant's sixth amendment speedy trial right embodied in Act's time
limit).
82. See 733 F.2d at 351-52 & n.1; supra note 76 and accompanying text (failure to treat
untimely petition as "proceeding" could result in unmerited grant of rehearing).
83. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (court will take petition for rehearing
under advisement, and will thus toll Act time limit for an extended period, only when sufficient
grounds warrant consideration of petition).
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42
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empowered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)2 to
prevent discriminatory employment practices. 3 An employee claiming to be
injured as a result of discrimination in employment must file a charge with
the EEOC before the employee can maintain a cause of action in federal
court. 4 After the party files the charge, Title VII gives the EEOC time to
notify the employer of the charge and to investigate the alleged discriminatory
employment practice.5 If the EEOC finds that the charge has merit, the
U.S.C. § 1981-2000h-6 (1982)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in a wide variety of areas that affect individual
activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000e-2 (1982). Specifically, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided
federal protection from discrimination in public accommodations and publicly owned or
managed facilities, in programs receiving federal funding, and in employment affecting interstate
commerce. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibited employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies from discriminating in their employment practices. Id.
at § 2000e-2. See generally Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684, 684
(1965) (general discussion of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1982). Congress established the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) as the agency responsible for the administration of Title VII. Id.
Congress created the EEOC as a permanent body composed of five members, no more than
three of whom may be members of the same political party. Id. Title VII also authorized the
President to appoint EEOC members, subject to the confirmation of the Senate, to staggered
five year terms. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982). Congress empowered the EEOC to prevent any person
from engaging in employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Id. Congress did not provide the EEOC with independent enforcement powers,
but rather authorized the EEOC to investigate charges of employment discrimination and to
seek resolution of charges through the informal means of mediation and conciliation. See id.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e5(a)-2000e-5(f) (1982). If the EEOC determines that a charge of
discriminatory employment practices has merit the EEOC must endeavor to eliminate the alleged
unlawful employment practice by the informal methods of mediation and conciliation. Id. §
2000e-5(b). If the EEOC is unable to negotiate a conciliation agreement within 30 days after an
aggrieved party files a charge, the EEOC may file suit against the employer charged with using
discriminatory employment practices. Id. § 2000e-5(9. If the EEOC dismisses the charge or for
any reason fails to negotiate a settlement or file suit within 180 days after the charge is filed,
the EEOC must issue a right to sue notice to the charging party. Id. Within 90 days after
receiving the EEOC's right to sue notice, the charging party may file suit against the charged
employer. Id.
5. Id. § 2000e-5(b). When the EEOC receives a charge of employment discrimination,
the EEOC must serve a notice of the complaint to the charged employer within 10 days after
the charge is filed. Id. The EEOC must indicate in the notice the circumstances of the alleged
discriminatory employment practice. Id. After the EEOC serves notice of the complaint to the
charged employer, the EEOC then investigates the charge to determine if reasonable cause exists
to support the allegations. Id. An EEOC investigation generally begins when an Equal Oppor-
tunity Specialist (EOS) is assigned to investigate the charge of employment discrimination. See
Note, The Use of EEOC Investigative Files In Title VII Actions, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1245, 1247
(1981) (discussion of EEOC investigative procedures). The EOS may interview parties, request
information through interrogatories, and issue subpoenas for the production of evidence or the
attendance and testimony of witnesses. Id. The scope of an EEOC investigation is not limited
however, to the specific circumstances alleged in a charge of employment discrimination, but
may include discrimination issues that the charging party did not allege. Id. at 1248. In addition,
the EEOC may seek other information that may assist in resolving other charges of employment
discrimination. Id. The evidence contained in an EEOC investigative file may include statements
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EEOC may negotiate a conciliation agreement between the employer and the
employee to eliminate the challenged employment practice.6 Title VII prevents
the EEOC from making public the contents of a charge7 or the information
obtained by the EEOC during an investigation.' In addition, Title VII
prohibits the EEOC from revealing any information about the EEOC's
informal endeavors to negotiate a conciliation agreement. 9
To implement the provisions of Title VII, Congress granted the EEOC
authority to establish procedural regulations.' 0 The EEOC subsequently
issued disclosure regulations that permit presuit disclosure to a charging
party of materials contained in the charging party's investigative file." In
by the employee, the employer, witnesses of the employer and the employee, the investigator's
recommendations, and the employer's records. Id. at 1250.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). If after investigation the EEOC finds that an employee's
complaint has merit, the EEOC must endeavor to eliminate the alleged discriminatory employ-
ment practice through the informal means of conciliation and negotiation. Id. If the EEOC is
unable to negotiate a conciliation agreement within 30 days after an aggrieved party files a
charge, the EEOC may file suit against the charged employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f). If after
investigation the EEOC does not have reasonable cause to believe that the allegations in the
charge are true, the EEOC may dismiss the charge. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Section 2000e-5(b) of Title VII prohibits the EEOC
from making public the contents of a charge of employment discrimination. Id. Senator Hubert
Humphrey, cosponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated during debate on the Act that the
disclosure provisions of Title VII were intended to prevent public dissemination of unproven
charges. See 110 CONG. Rac. 12,723 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1982). Section 2000e-8(e) of Title VII prohibits the EEOC
from making public in any manner whatsoever any information obtained by the EEOC during
the investigation of a charge. Id. Section 2000e-8(e) further states that any officer or employee
of the EEOC who makes public any information obtained by the EEOC during an investigation
is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.; see supra note 5 (contents of EEOC investigative file may
include statements by employer and employees, investigator's recommendations, and employer's
records); see also supra note 7 (disclosure provisions of Title VII were intended to prevent
public dissemination of unproven charges).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Section 2000e-5(b) of Title VII prohibits the officers
and employees of the EEOC from making public anything said or done during the EEOC's
informal endeavors to negotiate a conciliation agreement to eliminate an alleged discriminatory
employment practice. Id. Section 2000e-5(b) of Title VII states that any officer or employer of
the EEOC who makes public the matters discussed in a conciliation meeting is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Id.; see supra note 7 (disclosure provisions of Title VII intended to prevent public
dissemination of unproven charges).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982). Congress authorized the EEOC to establish procedural
regulations to enable the EEOC to carry out the provisions of Title VII. Id.; see also EEOC v.
Raymond Metal Products Co., 530 F.2d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging EEOC's
authority to make procedural rules). In EEOC v. Raymond Metal Products, Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Congress had empowered
the EEOC to make suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of Title VI. 530
F.2d at 592-93.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1984). The EEOC's general policy on disclosure states that the
EEOC shall not make public charges, investigative information, or records and reports filed by
the EEOC. Id. The EEOC has stated, however, that disclosure to charging parties is not
prohibited when disclosure is necessary to secure appropriate relief. Id. In fact, the EEOC has
created special disclosure rules pertaining to charging parties. See 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(d) (1984)
(EEOC's special disclosure rules for disclosure of information to charging parties are contained
[Vol. 42:447
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Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC,12 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue whether the EEOC's disclosure
rules were valid and enforceable.'
3
In Associated Dry Goods, several employees and former employees of
the Joseph Horne Company (the Company), a subsidiary of the Associated
Dry Goods Corporation,' 4 filed charges against the Company with the
EEOC. 5 The charging parties alleged that the Company engaged in discrim-
inatory employment practices in violation of Title VII.16 The EEOC began
investigating the charges of employment discrimination in 1974.17 A short
time later, the Pittsburgh district office of the EEOC served interrogatories
on the Company.'" Before answering the interrogatories the Company re-
quested assurances that the EEOC would not disclose the answers to the
interrogatories to the charging parties.' 9 The EEOC, however, refused to
in EEOC Compliance Manual); see also EEOC Compliance Manual §§ 83.3-83.5(e) (1975).
According to the EEOC, the charging party is not a member of the public to whom disclosure
of information regarding the charge, investigation, or negotiation is prohibited. EEOC Com-
pliance Manual § 83.5(e) (1975). The special disclosure rules permit disclosure to the charging
party if the charging party has received a right to sue notice or has demonstrated a compelling
need for disclosure. Id. §§ 83.3(a)-83.5(a). Before the charging party may receive information
contained in the EEOC case files, the charging party must agree in writing not to make the
information public. Id. § 83.3(b). The special disclosure rules permit disclosure to a charged
employer and the attorneys representing the charged employer after the charging party files suit
under Title VII. Id. §§ 83.3(a)-83.5(a). After the charging party receives a right to sue notice
under Title VII, the information contained in the charging party's case file may be disclosed to
the charging party and the attorneys representing the charging parties on request. Id.
12. 720 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1983).
13. Id. at 808.
14. See Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 419 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D. Va. 1976).
In Associated Dry Goods v. EEOC, the Associated Dry Goods Corporation was a Virginia
corporation that owned numerous retail department stores across the United States. Id. The
Joseph Home Company was a subsidiary of the Associated Dry Goods Corporation and
operated retail stores in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Id.
15. See 720 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir. 1983).
16. 454 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. Va. 1978). In Associated Dry Goods, several employees
and former employees of the Joseph Home Company (the Company) filed charges alleging that
the Company had engaged in discriminatory employment practices on the basis of race or sex.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4-2000e-5 (1982) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices).
17. 454 F. Supp at 389.
18. 419 F. Supp. at 817. The interrogatories at issue in Associated Dry Goods Corp. V.
EEOC sought a wide range of information relating to the business and employment practices
of the Joseph Home Company, a subsidiary of the Associated Dry Goods Corporation. Id.
The EEOC requested the employment records of the employees who filed charges along with
statistics and documents describing the general personnel practices of the Company. Id.
19. Id. In Associated Dry Goods, the Joseph Horne Company refused to answer the
interrogatories without an assurance of nondisclosure. Id. The reluctance of the Company to
answer the requested interrogatories stemmed from a previous incident in which the EEOC
revealed the Company's answer to a February, 1974 interrogatory to an attorney for one of the
charging parties. Id.; see Brief for Appellee at 3 n.2, Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC,
720 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1983). The interrogatory disclosed by the EEOC contained the names of
all the charging parties and questions from which the substance of the charges could be inferred.
Brief for Appellee at 3 n.2. The attorney who received the interrogatory represented the
1985]
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provide any assurance that the Company's responses would not be disclosed
to the charging parties.
20
Without an assurance of nondisclosure, the Company refused to answer
the EEOC's interrogatories. 2' The EEOC subsequently issued a subpoena to
compel the Company to produce the requested information. 22 In response,
the Company petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia to enjoin the enforcement of the EEOC's subpoena, but
the district court denied the petition.23 Rather than comply with the subpoena,
the defendant's parent company, Associated Dry Goods Corporation (As-
sociated), filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia. 24 Associated alleged that the EEOC's disclosure rules violated
sections 706(b) and 709(e) of Title VII which prohibit public disclosure of
investigative materials. 2 In addition, Associated asserted that the EEOC's
disclosure rules were substantive in nature and, therefore, exceeded the
EEOC's statutory authority to issue procedural rules and regulations. 26
Associated also contended that as substantive rules, the EEOC's disclosure
rules were not issued in accordance with the notice and comment requirements
of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
27
Company's business competitors and labor unions that had collective bargaining agreements
with the Company. Id.
20. 454 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. Va. 1978). In Associated Dry Goods, the EEOC explained
that the EEOC would disclose to any charging party any information compiled during the
investigation concerning both the party's case and related cases involving the same employer.
Id. The EEOC acknowledged, however, that the EEOC had no means of assuring that the
charging parties would not transmit the disclosed information to others. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1982) (applying the National Labor Relations Act, which
authorizes NLRB to issue subpoenas requiring testimony and attendance of witnesses or
production of evidence to all EEOC investigations and hearings); 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1982)
(codifying NLRA and authorizing NLRB to issue subpoenas requiring attendance and testimony
of witnesses or production of evidence). Congress has authorized the EEOC to issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence applicable
to the proceedings or investigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1982). Employers may challenge an
EEOC subpoena and if the evidence requested is irrelevant or if the subpoena is not sufficiently
specific the EEOC will revoke the subpoena. Id. If an employer fails to comply with an EEOC
subpoena the EEOC can petition for enforcement of the subpoena in federal district court. Id.
§ 161(2) (1982).
23. 454 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. Va. 1978).
24. 720 F.2d at 806.
25. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1982) (prohibiting EEOC from making
public contents of a charge, investigative information, or anything said or done during EEOC
conciliation endeavors); see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussion of disclosure
provisions of Title VII).
26. 720 F.2d at 806; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982) (authorizing EEOC to establish
procedural regulations to carry out provisions of Title VII).
27. 720 F.2d at 806-07; see Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (requiring
notice and comment procedures for proposed rule making). The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) requires each administrative agency to publish general notice of a proposed rulemaking
in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The notice must include the time, place, and
nature of the rule making proceedings along with information describing the substance of the
[Vol. 42:447
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The district court ruled only on Associated's allegation that the EEOC's
disclosure rules violated Title VII's prohibition against public disclosure of
investigative materials. 2 The district court ruled that section 709(e) of Title
VII specifically prohibited disclosure of the EEOC's investigative files to
anyone outside of the federal government, including charging parties. 29 The
district court therefore held that the EEOC's rules permitting pretrial disclo-
sure of investigative materials to charging parties violated section 709(e).
30
The EEOC appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 31 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination by stating that sections 709(e) and 706(b) of Title VII
necessarily prohibit disclosure of investigative materials to charging parties
prior to suit.
3 2
On a writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in Associated Dry Goods, holding that Congress did
not intend section 706(b) and 709(e) of Title VII to prohibit disclosure of
confidential information to charging parties. 33 The Supreme Court stated,
however, that a charging party must be considered a member of the public
to whom disclosure is prohibited with respect to related charges filed by
proposed rules and the subjects or issues involved. Id. §§ 553(b)(1)-553(b)(3). After an admin-
istrative agency publishes notice of a proposed rule making, the agency must provide interested
parties with an opportunity to participate in the rule making. Id. § 553(c). The hearing enables
interested parties to submit written data or arguments concerning the proposed rule making
with or without an opportunity for oral presentation. Id. Section 553(c) of the APA requires
administrative agencies to consider all relevant matter presented and to produce a general
statement of the basis and purpose of the adopted rules. Id. Interpretive rules and rules of
agency procedure are exempted from the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id. § 553(b)(A).
28. 720 F.2d at 807.
29. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1982) (prohibiting EEOC from making public any
information obtained during EEOC investigation); see also supra note 8 (Title VII prohibits
disclosure of investigative materials to the public).
30. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1982) (prohibiting EEOC from making public any
information obtained during EEOC investigation); see also supra note 8 (Title VII prohibits
disclosure of investigative materials to the public).
31. EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F.2d 1075, 1077 (4th Cir. 1979).
32. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1982) (prohibiting EEOC from making
public contents of a charge, investigative information, and anything said or done during EEOC
conciliation efforts); see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussion of disclosure
provisions of Title VII).
33. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 598 (1981). The United States
Supreme court in EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp. held that the legislative history and
policy of Title VII supported the EEOC's rules authorizing disclosure of materials contained in
the charging parties investigative files to charging parties. 449 U.S. 598; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1982) (prohibiting EEOC from making public contents of a charge, investigative
information, and anything said or done during EEOC conciliation efforts); see also 110 CONG.
Rac. 12,723 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey regarding Title VII). Senator Humphrey,
cosponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated that the disclosure provisions of Title VII
were intended to prevent public dissemination of unproven charges, but not to prevent limited
disclosures necessary to carry out the EEOC's functions. 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964).
1985]
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other parties. 34 The Supreme Court did not rule on whether the disclosure
rules exceeded the EEOC's statutory authority or violated the notice and
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act because the lower
courts had not decided these issues. 35 The Supreme Court, therefore, re-
manded the case to .the district court for further proceedings consistent with
the Court's opinion.
3 6
On remand, the district court in Associated Dry Goods again found the
EEOC's disclosure rules invalid.37 The district court determined first that the
disclosure rules were substantive and therefore exceeded the EEOC's limited
authority to issue procedural rules. 38 The district court stated, however, that
if an agency promulgates a substantive rule that exceeds the agency's statutory
authority, the rule necessarily must be considered a nonbinding interpretive
rule. 39 The district court recognized that the EEOC's disclosure rules could
be considered nonbinding interpretive rulings of the EEOC.40 As a result,
the district court did not rest its holding solely on the ground that the
34. 449 U.S. at 603. In Associated Dry Goods,, the Supreme Court invalidated the
EEOC's practice of disclosing information in related case files to the charging parties. Id. The
Supreme Court's opinion, however, emphasized that permitting limited disclosure to the charging
parties may assist the EEOC's investigation by providing specific information for the parties to
corroborate or rebut. Id. at 600-01. The Supreme Court also stated that limited disclosure may
enhance the EEOC's ability to resolve the allegedly unlawful employment practice through
negotiation and conciliation. Id. at 601. The Court noted that disclosure may encourage litigation
in some instances, but emphasized that Congress intended charging parties to act as private
attornies general enforcing the ban on discrimination. Id. at 602.
35. Id. at 594 n.4.
36. Id. at 604.
37. Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 543 F. Supp. 950, 967 (E.D. Va. 1982).
38. 543 F. Supp. at 953. In Associated Dry Goods, the district court, on remand,
emphasized that the procedural label attached by the EEOC to the EEOC's disclosure regulations
did not prevent the district court from making an alternative finding. Id. The district court
stated that the disclosure rules did more than merely regulate the procedure for handling
disclosure requests. Id. at 956. The district court stated that the impact of the EEOC's disclosure
rules substantively affected the rights of the parties. Id. at 954. The district court found that
the EEOC's disclosure rules substantively affected the parties because under the rules a charging
party would receive access to information 180 days after filing a charge with the EEOC, but
the charged employer would receive access only after the charging party filed suit in federal
district court. Id. at 957. The district court in Associated Dry Goods recognized that granting
charging parties access to the EEOC's investigative files before allowing access to the charged
employer could have a profound impact upon the ultimate disposition of the charges of
employment discrimination. Id. at 954. The district court stated that both parties involved in
the suit would be better able to assess the feasibility of litigation and would be more likely to
settle the dispute if the EEOC's investigative files were disclosed to both parties at the same
time. Id. The district court concluded that the substantive impact of the disclosure regulations
indicated that, in issuing the disclosure rules, the EEOC had exceeded its statutory authority to
issue procedural rules. Id. at 957.
39. Id. at 958; see Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Batterton
v. Marshall, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
a rule which exceeds an agency's statutory authority must be considered an interpretive rule
regardless of the rule's form or scope. 648 F.2d at 705.
40. 543 F. Supp. at 958. The district court in Associated Dry Goods acknowledged that
[Vol. 42:447
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disclosure regulations exceeded the EEOC's statutory authority, but consid-
ered the validity of the disclosure regulations as interpretive rules. 41 The
district court acknowledged that although courts generally should give some
deference to the interpretive rulings of an administrative agency, 42 courts
need not give deference to the EEOC's disclosure regulations since a confus-
ing inconsistency surrounded the development of the rules. 43 The district
court also held that even if the EEOC's disclosure regulations could be
considered nonbinding interpretive rules, the substantial impact of the dis-
closure rules on the substantive rights of the parties required the EEOC to
follow the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment provisions
in promulgating the rules. 44
In reviewing the Associated Dry Goods case, the Fourth Circuit reversed
even a finding that the disclosure rules were substantive would not render the regulations
necessarily invalid. Id. The district court stated that courts could regard the EEOC's regulations
on disclosure as interpretive rules that, although not binding on the courts, would be entitled
to some judicial deference. Id.; see General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
the United States Supreme Court stated that the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII are not
controlling upon the courts, but constitute a body of expertise and informed judgment that the
courts may rely upon for guidance. Id. at 141-42. The Gilbert Court further stated that the
particular weight a court should give an agency's interpretive regulations will depend upon the
consistency of the regulations, the agency's earlier pronouncements, and the validity of the
agency's reasoning in establishing the regulations. Id. at 142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. at 140).
41. 543 F. Supp. at 958; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (Congress authorized
EEOC to issue procedural rules to carry out provisions of Title VII).
42. 543 F. Supp. at 958; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (courts generally give
some deference to interpretive rulings of administrative agency).
43. 543 F. Supp. at 962. In Associated Dry Goods, the district court remarked that the
EEOC's persistent lack of clarity provided the only consistent aspect of the EEOC's regulations
regarding disclosure. Id. The district court noted that in 1965 the EEOC issued its primary
regulation governing disclosure. Id. at 959; see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1965). The regulation
permitted disclosure to a charging party if necessary or appropriate to carry out the EEOC's
function. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1965). In 1977, the EEOC changed its initial disclosure regulation
to permit disclosure to charging parties if necessary to secure appropriate relief. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.22 (1977). The EEOC first issued the special disclosure rules for charging parties and
charged employers in 1975. See 29 C.F.R. 1610.17(d) (1975) (referring to special disclosure rules
embodied in § 83 of the EEOC Compliance Manual); see supra note 11 and accompanying text
(discussion of EEOC's special disclosure rules). The district court in Associated Dry Goods
held, therefore, that the EEOC's special disclosure rules lacked a contemporaneous interpretation
from Title VII and merited little judicial deference. 543 F. Supp. at 962.
44. 543 F. Supp. at 967. In Associated Dry Goods, the district court held that since the
EEOC's disclosure regulations had such significant impact and effect on the rights and
obligations of charging parties and charged employers the EEOC should have provided notice
and comment in promulgating the disclosure rules. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (requiring
notice and comment of a proposed rule making); supra note 27 (discussion of notice and
comment provision of Administrative Procedure Act); see also Asimow, Public Participation In
The Adoption Of Interpretive Rules And Policy Statements, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 520, 552 (1977)
(substantial impact of interpretive regulation may require notice and opportunity to be heard).
45. See 720 F.2d 804, 812 (4th Cir. 1983).
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the district court's ruling and held that the EEOC's disclosure regulations
were valid procedural rules. 45 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Congress
had not empowered the EEOC with the authority to impose binding sub-
stantive obligations upon the parties. 46 After examining the function and
effect of the EEOC's disclosure regulations the Fourth Circuit stated that
the disclosure rules were not substantive in nature but were valid procedural
regulations. 47 Furthermore, contrary to the district court's holding in Asso-
ciated Dry Goods, the Fourth Circuit found that the EEOC's disclosure
rules, even if considered as interpretive rules, were valid and entitled to
judicial deference.
48
The Fourth Circuit also disputed the district court's contention that the
EEOC's disclosure rules substantially disadvantaged the charged employer.
49
46. Id. at 809. In a 1976 case, EEOC v. Raymond Metal Products Co., the Fourth Circuit
noted that Congress has mandated that the EEOC may issue only procedural rules. 530 F.2d
590, 593 (4th Cir. 1976); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982). The Fourth Circuit stated that
Congress specifically denied the EEOC the power to make substantive rules that create rights
and obligations. 530 F.2d at 593. The Fourth Circuit in Raymond Metal Products further noted
that the administrative actions of the EEOC do not in themselves create any rights or impose
any obligations on the parties. Id.; see Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.
1979) (EEOC has no adjudicative powers and thus EEOC's proceedings are not binding on
employers); supra note 10 and accompanying text (Congress authorized EEOC to establish
procedural rules to carry out provisions of Title VII).
47. 720 F.2d at 809. The Fourth Circuit in Associated Dry Goods emphasized that courts
generally consider regulations relating to disclosure of information in administrative proceedings
to be procedural rules. Id. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. United States stated that the particular label placed on an administrative agency's
regulation is not dispositive on the regulation's function. 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942). Only the
actual substance and the purported function of the agency's regulation is dispositive of whether
the rule is substantive or procedural. Id. For example, in FCC v. Schreiber, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Federal Communications Commission regulation authorizing disclosure
of financial information as a valid procedural rule. 381 U.S. 279, 288 (1965). In Associated
Dry Goods, the Fourth Circuit stated that it perceived no distinction between the function of
the FCC procedural rule in Schreiber and the EEOC disclosure regulations in Associated Dry
Goods. 720 F.2d at 809.
48. 720 F.2d at 811. The Fourth Circuit stated in Associated Dry Goods that the EEOC's
disclosure rules had remained consistent over a long period of time and were entitled to judicial
deference. Id.; see American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir.
1982). In American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, the petitioners brought an action chal-
lenging the validity of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation that governed the antitrust
exemption of motor carrier rate bureaus. 688 F.2d at 1341. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit stated that an agency necessarily possesses the implied authority to
issue interpretive rules to enforce the terms of the agency's governing statute. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit also stated that courts generally will give great deference to an agency's interpretive
rules as long as the rules are consistent and reasonable. Id. at 1342; see also supra note 40 and
accompanying text (courts generally give deference to interpretive rules of administrative
agencies).
49. Associated Dry Goods, 720 F.2d at 811. In Associated Dry Goods, the Fourth Circuit
stated that the EEOC's disclosure regulations would not provide a substantive advantage to
charging parties. Id. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that a charging party's right to disclosure
did not occur until 180 days following the filing of a complaint of employment discrimination.
Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that after 180 days, the charging party's right to sue already had
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The Fourth Circuit noted that allowing disclosure of investigative materials
to the charging party 180 days after the charge is filed would not provide
the charging party with a substantive advantage in any subsequent suit.
5 0
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act exempted the EEOC's disclosure rules, whether labeled as
procedural or interpretive, from notice and comment prior to the rules
promulgation."' Thus, the Fourth Circuit, in Associated Dry Goods, held
that the EEOC's disclosure regulations were valid procedural rules.
52
The Fourth Circuit in Associated Dry Goods noted that Congress granted
the EEOC authority to issue procedural regulations to carry out the provi-
sions of Title VII.53 The provisions of Title VII establish an enforcement
scheme that directs the EEOC to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices through the use of informal methods such as negotiation and
conciliation.5 4 As a secondary method of enforcement Title VII also provides
that the EEOC may bring a civil action against the charged employer if the
EEOC's endeavors to negotiate an acceptable conciliation agreement fail.5
Title VII further provides that the charging party may bring a civil action
against the charged employer if the EEOC dismisses the charge or falls to
negotiate a conciliation agreement within 180 days after the charging party
files the complaint.5 6 Congress, therefore, specified that the EEOC's endeav-
ors to eliminate discriminatory employment practices through the informal
methods of negotiation and conciliation would be the preferred means of
assuring equality in employment practices.5 7
accrued and the conciliation period presumably had expired. Id. The Fourth Circuit further
noted that since a charged employer is entitled to immediate disclosure when the charging party
files suit, the charged employer would not suffer substantial prejudice from the lack of access
during the presuit phase. Id.
50. Id.; see supra note 49 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit stated EEOC's disclosure
rules would not provide charging party with substantive advantage).
51. 720 F.2d at 812; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (requiring notice and comment of proposed
rule making); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussion of notice and comment
provision of Administrative Procedure Act).
52. 720 F.2d at 809.
53. Id. at 807; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982) (Congress authorized EEOC to issue
procedural rules to carry out provisions of Title VII); see also supra note 10 and accompanying
text (EEOC has no power to issue substantive rules creating rights and obligations).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (EEOC must endeavor to eliminate discriminatory
employment practices through negotiation and conciliation); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the United States Supreme
Court stated that Congress established the EEOC to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices. 415 U.S. at 44. The Supreme Court stated that the EEOC's endeavors to achieve
voluntary compliance through negotiation and conciliation is the preferred means of achieving
this statutory goal. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982) (EEOC may bring civil action against charged
employer if unable to reach conciliation agreement with 30 days after charge is filed).
56. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(A) (charging party may bring civil action against charged employer
if EEOC dismisses charge or fails to negotiate conciliation agreement within 180 days).
57. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 7168 (1971). In enacting Title VII Congress
had hoped that recourse to a private civil action would be the exception and that the EEOC's
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The EEOC's current disclosure regulations do not support or carry out
the enforcement scheme of Title VII, which promotes the use of negotiation
and conciliation to eliminate discriminatory employment practices. 8 The
EEOC's disclosure rules provide for disclosure of investigative materials to
a charging party 180 days after the charging party filed an employment
discrimination charge or even earlier than 180 days if the charging party
demonstrates a compelling need for access.-9 The charged employer, however,
is given access to EEOC investigative materials Qnly after the charging party
files suit in federal district court 0 The one-sided nature of the EEOC's
disclosure regulations may encourage the filing of private lawsuits and
frustrate the EEOC's investigative efforts.6' The EEOC's efforts to reach a
conciliation agreement are not necessarily exhausted 180 days after a charging
party files an employment discrimination complaint. Disclosure of investi-
gative materials to a charging party while the EEOC continues its efforts to
reach a conciliation agreement may disrupt the EEOC's endeavors to nego-
tiate a settlement by diminishing the charging party's willingness to settle the
dispute. 62 The present disclosure regulations do not support or carry out the
provisions of Title VII and therefore are not valid procedural rules. 63
endeavors to reach an acceptable conciliation agreement would be the primary remedy for
discriminatory employment practices. id.
58. See Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097, 1099 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). In Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC's disclosure regulations were entirely
inconsistent with the enforcement scheme of Title VII. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the
enforcement scheme of Title VII emphasized the EEOC's efforts to reach a conciliation
agreement as the primary remedy for discriminatory employment practices. Id. The Seventh
Circuit asserted that the EEOC's disclosure rules would disrupt the enforcement scheme of Title
VII because disclosure of investigative materials to charging parties would encourage the filing
of private lawsuits. Id. at 1100; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 946
(D.C. Cir. 1978). In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the statutory scheme of Title VII promotes cooperation and
voluntary compliance as the preferred means of eliminating discriminatory employment practices.
581 F.2d at 946. The District of Columbia Circuit stated that the EEOC's disclosure regulations
would encourage private litigation and drastically undermine the EEOC's efforts to eliminate
unlawful employment practices through negotiation and conciliation. Id. In Sears, Roebuck,
the EEOC began to disclose investigative information to the charging parties after nearly four
years of extensive negotiations with the charged employer. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit
emphasized that the EEOC's disclosure rules improperly subordinated the EEOC's efforts to
achieve a conciliation agreement to enable a few charging parties to file private civil actions.
Id.
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussion of EEOC's special disclosure
rules).
60. Id.
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (EEOC disclosure rules encourage private
litigation and undermine enforcement scheme of Title VII).
62. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (EEOC disclosure rules undermine
EEOC's efforts to eliminate discriminatory employment practices through negotiation and
conciliation).
63. See supra notes 10, 53 and accompanying text (Congress authorized EEOC to issue
procedural rules to carry out provisions of Title VII)
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In Associated Dry Goods, the Fourth Circuit held that the EEOC's
disclosure regulations were valid procedural rules issued to carry out the
provisions of Title VII. 64 The Fourth Circuit, however, neglected to consider
the adverse effects of disclosure upon the EEOC's endeavors to eliminate
unlawful employment practices through conciliation and negotiation. Since
the EEOC's disclosure regulations impair the enforcement scheme of Title
VII, the regulations cannot be considered valid procedural rules.
ROBERT WALKER Humpmu~s
B. Federal Pension Offset Provisions:
Minimum Standard or Federal Mandate?
Title III and Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935' established the
first national unemployment insurance program.2 Congress intended that the
unemployment compensation system provide compensation to workers who
had become unemployed through no fault of their own.' In response to the
common state practice of paying unemployment benefits to retired persons
who already were receiving retirement pensions, Congress enacted section
64. 720 F.2d at 809.
1. Social Security Act, ch. 531, Title III, 49 Stat. 620, 626-27 (1935) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-506 (1982)); Social Security Act, ch. 531, Title IX, 49 Stat. 620, 639-45
(1935) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982)).
2. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937) (before Congress
enacted Social Security Act, only five states had adopted unemployment insurance programs).
See generally, Witte, An Historical Account of Unemployment Insurance in the Social Security
Act, 3 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1936) (historical review of unemployment compensation
in United States). In 1932, Wisconsin became the first state in the nation to enact an
unemployment compensation program. Witte, supra, at 157; see 1931-1932 Wis. Laws, ch. 20
(1931) (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. §§ 108.01-108.26 (1981)) (Wisconsin unemployment
insurance statute). Congress enacted title III and title IX to encourage the promulgation of state
unemployment insurance statutes. Witte, supra, at 168-69. Witte notes that Congress passed
title III and title IX as a cooperative system, and not as a distinctly federal or state endeavor.
Id. at 168.
3. See Report of the Committee on Economic Security: Hearings on S. 1130 before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1311 (1935) (unemployment insurance
envisioned as subsistence benefits to unemployed worker for limited period in expectation he
will be reemployed) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Committee on Economic Security];
Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND.
L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1955) (discussion of Committee on Economic Security Report); UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EcoNoinc SECURITY, MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF FEDERAL-
STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY PROGRAM, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION LETTER No. 305 (1955)
(unemployment insurance program provides income maintenance during period of involuntary
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3304(a)(15) of title 26 of the United States Code.4 Section 3304(a)(15), as
originally enacted, required the states to offset unemployment compensation
payments by the amount of any pension, public or private, that an applicant
already was receiving.5 In 1977, the Virginia General Assembly enacted
section 60.1-48.1 of the Virginia Code6 to conform with section 3304(a)(15)
as required by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 7 Although Congress
subsequently limited section 3304(a)(15) to encompass only pensions received
fr6m a base-period employer,' the Virginia statute continued to require an
unemployment) [hereinafter cited as GEaERAL ADMINISTRATION LETTER No. 3051. General
Administration Letter No. 305 stated that unemployment compensation provides income main-
tenance to the jobless without a loss of dignity. GENERAL ADMIMSTRATION LETTER No. 305.
Furthermore, unemployment benefits not only stabilize the economy and consumer purchasing
power, but also provides an incentive to individual employers to stabilize employment by
providing a lower tax rate to employers who maintain a regular labor force. Id. See generally
W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE Am isucAN ECONOMY 26-32 (1966)
(unemployment insurance stabilizes economy and employment and prevents destruction to
businesses during recession).
4. Pub. Law 94-566, § 314, 90 Stat. 2680 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15)
(1976)). See S. RP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
& CONG. AD. NEws 5997, 6015-6016 (uniform rule needed to prohibit states from paying
unemployment compensation benefits to persons receiving pension or retirement pay); S. REP.
No. 472, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979) (§ 3304(a)(15) enacted because of congressional
concern over situation in which retired individual was receiving both retirement pension and
unemployment benefits). Following the initial passage of § 3304(a)(15), Congress changed the
effective date of the legislation from September 30, 1979 to March 31, 1980. Pub. Law 95-19,
91 Stat. 39 (1977).
5. See 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(15) (1976) (unemployment compensation shall be reduced by
an amount equal to amount of any pension, retirement pay or annuity).
6. VA. CODE § 60.1-48.1 (1983). The Virginia offset provision reduces unemployment
benefits by an amount equal to the amount of any retirement payment an individual is receiving.
Id.
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1982) (Secretary of Labor must approve state unemployment
compensation statute before state may receive federal funding).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 538, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) (base-period employer is any
employer who paid wages on which unemployment benefits of claimant and amount of duration
of benefits are based). Several congressmen believed that the 1976 version of § 3304(a)(15)
unduly restricted state discretion in determining an applicant's eligibility for unemployment
benefits because the federal offset provision reduced unemployment compensation by the amount
of any pension. S. REP. No. 472, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1979). These congressmen
consequently sponsored legislation to limit the impact of the federal offset provision. 125 CONG.
REc. 27, 558 (1979). On October 9, 1979, the congressmen introduced H.R. 5507 to amend §
3304(a)(15). Id. The House passed an amended version of H.R. 5507 on February 6, 1980. 126
CONG. REc. 2149 (1980). The Senate did not consider H.R. 5507, but instead amended H.R.
4612, a bill providing additional benefits for disabled children, to include the revised federal
pension offset provision. 126 CONG. REc. 4572-4575 (1980). Congress did not pass the revised
§ 3304(a)(15) until September 26, 1980, as an amendment to the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Act of 1980. Pub. Law 96-364, 94 Stat. 1310 (1980).
Section 3304(a)(15) currently requires the states to reduce unemployment benefits by
pension, retirement, or other similar payments only if the pension or retirement payment is




offset by the amount of any pension.9 In Watkins v. Cantrell, 10 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Congress, by limiting the scope
of the federal offset provision, prohibited the states from enacting pension
offset statutes broader than those required by federal law."
In Watkins, plaintiff Geraldine Watkins retired in 1972 and began to
collect a civil service disability retirement pension from the United States
Government.' 2 In August 1980, Watkins obtained new employment as a
nursing assistant because the pension was insufficient to meet her financial
needs. 3 Upon her termination as a nursing assistant in June 1981, Watkins
filed for unemployment benefits with the Virginia Employment Commission
(VEC). 4 The VEC informed Watkins that she was eligible for unemployment
compensation, but that the entitlement would be reduced by the amount of
her pension payments.' 5 Watkins subsequently initiated a class action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against four
VEC administrators.' 6 Watkins alleged that section 60.1-48.1 of the Virginia
Code violated the federal pension provision in section 3304(a)(15) because
the Virginia statute reduced her benefits by a pension received from a non-
base-period employer.' 7 The district court in Watkins held that section 60.1-
48.1 did not contravene federal law because Congress did not explicitly
9. VA. CODE § 60.1-48.1 (1982); see Watkins v. Cantrell, 568 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (E.D.
Va. 1983) (Virginia General Assembly did not change § 60.1-48.1 to reflect the revised federal
requirement), aff'd, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984).
10. 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984).
11. Id. at 935-36.
12. Id. at 936.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In Watkins v. Cantrell, the VEC determined that Watkins was eligible for $78 per
week in unemployment compensation, but, when reduced by the $76 per week she received
from her civil service pension, Watkins would have received only $2 per week in unemployment
benefits. Id.
16. Id.; see Watkins v. Cantrell, 568 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1983) (discussion
of members of class). The trial judge in Watkins certified the class pursuant to rules 23(a) and
(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include Virginia residents who qualify for
unemployment compensation and whose benefits have been or will be reduced by the pension
offset provision in § 60.1-48.1 of the Virginia Code where the pension is paid by employers
other than a base-period or chargeable employer. 568 F. Supp. at 1226 n.1; see FED. R. Ciw.
P. 23(a), (b)(2) (class certification appropriate if party opposing class has acted toward class in
such manner that final injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary to protect class as whole).
Additionally, the class included social security beneficiaries who qualified for social security
benefits by working for employers other than a base-period or chargeable employer. 568 F.
Supp. at 1226 n.I.
17. 736 F.2d at 936. In Watkins, in addition to alleging that § 60.1-48.1 violated 26
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15), Watkins alleged that the Virginia offset provision violated the "when
due" clause of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1982) (Secretary of Labor
shall not certify state's unemployment insurance program unless program assures payment of
benefits when due); see also California Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 133
(1971) ("when due" is time when payments are first allowed administratively). The Watkins
court concluded that whether § 60.1-48.1 of the Virginia Code violated the § 503(a)(1) "when
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forbid the states from enacting statutes which reduce unemployment benefits
by any pension an applicant might be receiving.'"
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Watkins v.
Cantrell,19 concluding that states may offset unemployment compensation by
pension payments in excess of the federal standard because section 3304(a)(15)
does not explicitly prohibit the states from considering non-base-period
employer sources of pension income.20 The Watkins court further noted that
the legislative history of section 3304(a)(15) indicated that Congress estab-
lished only a minimum standard and that the states were free to reduce
unemployment compensation by pensions received from employers who do
not qualify as base-period employers. 2' Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the Secretary of Labor had interpreted section 3304(a)(15) as allowing the
states to reduce unemployment benefits by pensions not governed by the
federal statute but prohibiting the states from adopting standards less restric-
tive than the federal requirement. 22 The Watkins court, therefore, held that
section 60.1-48.1 of the Virginia Code did not violate federal law.
23
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Watkins is consistent with recognized
principles of statutory construction. As a general rule, a court initially must
due" clause was dependent upon whether the Virginia pension offset provision violated 26
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15). 736 F.2d at 936 n.3. The Fourth Circuit never addressed the "when due"
clause issue, because the court held that the Virginia pension offset statute did not contravene
federal law. Id. at 944-45.
18. 568 F. Supp. at 1227-28. The district court in Watkins concluded that § 60.1-48.1 of
the Virginia Code did not violate federal law because states historically have exercised broad
discretion in the formulation of unemployment compensation programs and because § 3304(a)(15)
did not explicitly forbid the states from enacting a pension offset provision in excess of the
federal requirement. Id.
19. 736 F.2d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1984); see 568 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(district court opinion holding states were free to exceed federal minimum standards).
20. 736 F.2d at 939.
21. Id. at 940.
22. Id. at 943-44; see infra note 4 (Secretary of Labor's interpretation of § 3304(a)(15)).
23. Id. at 945. In addition to holding that § 60.1-48.1 did not contravene the federal
offset provision in § 3304(a)(15), the Watkins court dismissed Watkins' claims that the Virginia
pension offset statute violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 945-46; see U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV (states shall not deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny any person equal protection of
laws). The Fourth Circuit held that § 60.1-48.1 passed constitutional scrutiny under the rational
basis test because the ease of administration and financial integrity of unemployment insurance
programs are legitimate state interests that justify the reduction of unemployment benefits in
excess of the federal requirement. 736 F.2d at 945-46. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371 (1971) (under traditional equal protection principles states retain broad discretion to
classify, but classifications must have reasonable basis, especially in areas of economic and
social legislation). Simply stated, the rational basis test ensures that state classifications which
do not impinge upon fundamental rights must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest on
some ground having a fair relation to the object of legislation. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (classification must be reasonably related to object legislature
sought to achieve); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US.. 61, 78 (1911) (where
classification is an issue, law will be sustained if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived
to support that classification).
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consider the plain meaning of the statute. 24 In New York Telephone Co. v.
New York State Department of Labor,2 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the National Labor Relations Act prohibited the State
of New York from paying unemployment compensation to strikers. 26 The
Supreme Court noted that the history of title IX of the Social Security Act
indicated that Congress intended the states to have broad discretion in
establishing unemployment compensation programs. 27 The New York Tele-
phone Court further observed that when Congress decided to impose a
limitation on state programs, it did so in explicit terms. 28 The Court concluded
that the absence of an express limitation or condition imposed on the states
indicated that Congress did not restrict state legislative discretion in the area
of social security. 29 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that New York could
pay unemployment benefits to striking workers because neither the National
Labor Relations Act nor title IX of the Social Security Act prohibited such
payments.30 Similarly, the Watkins court held that the states could reduce
unemployment benefits received by individuals from non-base period em-
ployers because section 3304(a)(15) does not explicitly forbid the states from
exceeding the federal standard in reducing benefits.
3'
The Watkins court's interpretation of section 3304(a)(15) also is consist-
ent with other cases construing the federal offset provision. In Cabais v.
Egger,3 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that unemployment insurance is a joint federal-state program
in which the federal government establishes minimum standards that allow
the states considerable flexibility in adopting their own rules.3 3 The Cabais
court determined that section 3304(a)(15) merely established a federal mini-
24. See Rivera v. Becarra, 714 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1983) (plain meaning of words is
best indicator of what legislature intended), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984); Matala v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 1981) (language of statute is starting point
for determining congressional intent).
25. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
26. Id. at 522.
27. Id. at 536-37. In New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, the
Supreme Court, after reviewing the legislative history of title IX, concluded that Congress
generally has allowed states the discretion to fashion their own unemployment insurance
programs and eligibility criteria. Id. at 539.
28. 440 U.S. at 537-38.
29. Id. at 538; see Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 488
(1977) (when Congress has imposed or forbidden condition for unemployment compensation,
Congress has done so explicitly).
30. 440 U.S. at 545-46. The New York Telephone Court, in holding that the states may
pay unemployment benefits to strikers, concluded that the State of New York did not usurp
the powers of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 546. Rather, the Court found that
New York administered its unemployment program in a manner consistent with the state's fiscal
policies. Id.
31. 736 F.2d at 939. The Watkins court concluded that Congress did not forbid the states
from enacting an offset provision in excess of that mandated by federal law because Congress
did not include such an express prohibition in § 3304(a)(15). Id.
32. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 235, 240.
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mum standard and that the states could offset unemployment benefits not
governed by the federal statute.3 4 The Cabais court thus concluded that a
state's pension offset provisions may produce a greater impact upon unem-
ployment beneficiaries than would be produced under the federal standard
because a state may choose to exceed the section 3304(a)(15) requirement."
Likewise, in McKay v. Horn,36 the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey addressed the constitutionality of section 3304(a)(15)
and the New Jersey pension offset provision, section 43:21-5(a) of the New
Jersey Statutes.3 7 In McKay, the plaintiffs contended that the reduction of
unemployment benefits by the amount of a pension received from a base-
period employer or by Social Security payments violated their equal protec-
tion rights guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments." The McKay
court held that the offset statutes did not violate the United States Consti-
tution because the reduction in benefits bore a rational relation to the
legitimate governmental purposes of preventing duplicative benefits and
maintaining the financial integrity of the unemployment insurance system.3 9
The McKay court noted further, however, that unemployment compensation
is a federal-state cooperative program in which the federal government
establishes certain minimum criteria governing the eligibility for and distri-
bution of benefit payments. 4° The McKay court concluded that section
3304(a)(15) constituted one of these minimum requirements. 4
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id.
36. 529 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
37. Id. at 849; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1980) (New Jersey pension offset
statute).
38. 529 F. Supp. at 849. In McKay v. Horn, the plaintiffs alleged that federal and state
pension offset statutes treated persons who receive pension income more harshly that those
unemployment applicants who receive supplemental income from other sources. id. at 859; see
U.S. Co sT. amend. V (federal government shall not deprive citizens of property without due
process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (states shall not deprive citizens of equal protection
of law); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (concept of equal justice
found in fifth amendment guarantee of due process). The McKay plaintiffs also alleged that §
3304(a)(15) impaired their right to contract in violation of article I, section 10 of the United
States Constitution because the federal offset provision disrupted the contract between the State
of New Jersey and the workers which obligated the state to pay benefits to the unemployed.
529 F. Supp. at 865; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (Congress shall pass no law impairing freedom
of contract).
39. 529 F. Supp. at 863-64. In McKay, the district court applied the rational basis test to
determine whether the pension offset provisions violated the plaintiff's equal protection rights.
Id. at 860; see Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (minimal
scrutiny applied to unemployment insurance amendments because statutes do not involve
fundamental interests or create suspect classifications); supra note 23 (discussion of rational
basis test). Thus, the McKay court upheld both offset statutes because Congress and the New
Jersey legislature reasonably could conclude that duplicative benefits overburden the unemploy-
ment insurance program. 529 F. Supp. at 864. The district court noted that Congress enacted
§ 3304(a)(15) to eliminate windfalls to persons receiving both pensions and unemployment
benefits. Id. at 863.
40. 529 F. Supp. at 850.
41. Id. at 850 n.4.
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In addition to case precedent, as exemplified in Cabais and McKay, the
legislative history of section 3304(a)(15) supports the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Watkins.4 2 In challenging the validity of section 60.1-48.1, Watkins relied
heavily upon statements made during congressional debates over the federal
pension offset provision.43 The Watkins court, however, found no explicit
statement in the debate transcripts which would indicate that Congress
prohibited the states from enacting pension offset provisions in excess of the
federal requirement. 4 The Fourth Circuit noted, rather, that one congress-
man explicitly stated that section 3304(a)(15) allows states the option of
adopting the federal standard or enacting statutes which reduce unemploy-
ment benefits by pensions received from non-base-period employers.4 5 The
Watkins court also referred to statements made throughout the congressional
debates which indicate that section 3304(a)(15) merely imposed a federal
minimum standard and that the states are free to enact statutes which offset
unemployment benefits by pensions not governed by the federal offset
provision.46 Finally, a report from the House Ways and Means Committee
expressly stated that the treatment of pension or retirement income received
42. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (legislative history indicates Congress
only established federal minimum standard).
43. 736 F.2d at 939-40. In Watkins, Watkins relied upon statements by various senators
made during debates over a proposal to amend H.R. 4612, a bill designed to provide benefits
to disable children, to include a revised version of § 3304(a)(15). Id. at 940. For example, one
senator stated that the proposed federal pension offset provision would assure that persons
actually unemployed, but not retired, would not be penalized for receiving pension payments.
126 CoNG. REc. 4562 (1980) (statements of Sen. Dole). Also, another senator stated that
Congress enacted the 1976 pension offset to prevent serious abuses in the unemployment
insurance program, such as the payment of benefits to a retiree who had completely withdrawn
from the labor force. Id. at 20, 238 (statements of Sen. Bradley). Senator Bradley concluded
that Congress did not intend for section 3304(a)(15) to punish retirees who are seeking a second
job to supplement an inadequate pension. Id. See 736 F.2d at 940 (Watkins court's discussion
of statements purporting to limit power of states to enact broader pension offsets).
44. 736 F.2d at 940.
45. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Watkins determined that the legislative history of §
3304(a)(15) indicated that Congress fully recognized that the states could enact pension offset
statutes that would reduce unemployment benefits by pensions paid by non-base-period em-
ployers. Id. at 942-43. Representative James Corman, a sponsor of the revised federal pension
offset statute, concluded that a state could, in its discretion, adopt a broader offset affecting
private pension plans or social security. 126 CONG. REc. 2144 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Corman). Corman warned, however, that if Congress did not pass H.R. 5507 (a bill to revise
§ 3304(a)(15)), the 1976 act would require that all pension or social security payments reduce
unemployment benefits on a pro rata basis. Id.
46. 736 F.2d at 941-42. In Watkins, the Fourth Circuit cited various statements made
during congressional debates that the court interpreted as allowing the states to enact broader
pension offset provisions. Id. at 941; see 126 CONG. REc. 2145 (1980) (if present law is changed
some states may eliminate or reduce their present offset statutes) (statement of Rep. Hopkins);
126 CoNG. REc. at 2144 (price of bill is $585 million for present fiscal year if states follow most
liberal course) (statement of Rep. Rousselot); 126 CONG. REc. at 23,049 (states only required
to reduce unemployment compensation when applicant is receiving pension from base-period
employer) (statement of Rep. Ullman).
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from an employer, other than a base-period employer, is a matter left to the
discretion of state legislatures. 7
The Watkins decision is also consistent with the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of section 3304(a)(15) .4 In Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter (UIPL) No. 1-81, the Secretary specifically stated that the federal
pension offset provision established only a minimum requirement.49 Notably,
the Secretary issued UIPL No. 7-81 contemporaneously with the promulga-
tion of section 3304(a)(15),10 and has adhered to the opinion that section
3304(a)(15) allows the states to offset benefits paid by non-base-period
employees.5 1 Additionally, the administrative opinion expressed in UIPL No.
7-81 is consistent with the legislative history and statutory language of section
3304(a)(15).5 2 UIPL No. 7-81, therefore, further supports the Watkins deci-
sion, particularly in view of the principle that an agency's interpretation of
a statute is entitled to considerable weight.
5 3
The Watkins court was the first federal circuit court to consider specif-
ically whether section 3304(a)(15), which requires the states to offset unem-
ployment payments by pensions paid by a base-period employer, established
47. H.R. REP. No. 538, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1979).
48. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL) No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,906
(1982) (UIPL No. 7-81 informs states of 1980 amendment to § 3304(a)(15) restricting application
of pension offset to base-period employers) [hereinafter cited as UIPL No. 7-81].
49. 736 F.2d at 943; UIPL No. 7-81, supra note 48, 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,906. In UIPL
No. 7-81, the Secretary of Labor indicated that state laws passed in compliance with the 1976
act did not have to be revised in order to satisfy the current offset provision's requirements.
UIPL No. 7-81, supra note 48, 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,906; see 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1976) (1976
pension offset provision requiring reduction of unemployment benefits by any pension). The
Secretary stated that § 3304(a)(15) established only a minimum standard and that the states
were free to consider additional sources of income in offsetting unemployment benefits. UIPL
No. 7-81, supra note 48, 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,906. The Secretary, however, encouraged the states
to follow the less stringent pension offset standard. Id.
50. 736 F.2d at 944; see, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46,
55 (1977) (agency's contemporaneous construction of statute entitled to great weight); Power
Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
396, 408 (1961) (court deference to administrative agency due when administrative practice in
issue involves contemporaneous construction of statute); FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S.
385, 391 (1959) (court should defer to agency's contemporaneous construction of statute).
51. 736 F.2d at 944; see, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)
(consistency is significant factor in determining weight accorded to agency interpretation); Cory
Corp. v. Sauber, 363 U.S. 709, 712 (1960) (agency's adherence to construction is important
factor in weighing deference due agency interpretation of statute); see UIPL No. 7-81, supra
note 48, 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,906 (1982) (§ 3304(a)(15) established only minimum standard leaving
states free to offset unemployment benefits by pensions not governed by federal offset provision);
UIPL No. 7-81, supra note 48, Change 2, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,741 (1983) (Secretary of Labor
encourages states to carry out congressional intent by offsetting pension benefits under §
3304(a)(15)(B) in excess of mandated requirement).
52. 736 F.2d at 944. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
107 (1979) (court deference to agency appropriate where legislative history does not require
contrary interpretation); Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (court deference to
agency constrained by duty to honor statutory language).
53. 736 F.2d at 944.
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a minimum standard or mandatory federal requirement that the states could
not exceed.5 4 Congress structured the unemployment insurance program as a
joint federal-state endeavor to provide benefits to the unemployed.5 5 Under
the cooperative system, the federal government establishes minimum stand-
ards to which the state laws must conform in order for the states to receive
certification of and funding for their programs.5 6 Basing its decision on the
federal offset provision's statutory language,57 legislative history,", and ad-
ministrative interpretation, 9 the Watkins court correctly determined that
section 3304(a)(15) only established a minimum federal standard and that
the states are free to exceed the federal requirement.6° The Watkins decision
thus accords with the congressional policy of allowing the states great
discretion in the formulation of benefit structures and eligibility criteria for
their individual unemployment programs.
6 1
KErT B. BROOKS
54. See Mayberry v. Adams, 745 F.2d 729, 730 (Ist Cir. 1984), (First Circuit summarily
held that Watkins v. Cantrell had decided that states may offset unemployment compensation
by applicant's government pension); Watkins, 736 F.2d at 945.
55. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1977)
(federal involvement in unemployment insurance exists through tax incentives to encourage state
programs); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (unemployment insurance
is joint federal-state program in which employers receive 90% credit against federal tax liability
under Federal Unemployment Tax Act, if state lav complies with federal standards). See also
W. HABER & M. MuRRAY, supra note 3, at 79 (Committee on Economic Security determined
that unemployment insurance would be cooperative federal-state program).
56. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593 (1937) (Social Security Act
establishes minimum requirements to which state unemployment compensation statutes must
conform); Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (Congress required states to
comply with limited number of fundamental standards in order to receive federal approval of
state law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1158 (1983).
57. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text (statutory language does not forbid
states from enacting broader pension offsets).
58. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (legislative history indicates § 3304(a)(15)
only established minimum standard).
59. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (courts should defer to agency interpre-
tation of statute).
60. 736 F.2d at 944-45; see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (statutory language,
legislative history, and administrative interpretation indicate § 3304(a)(15) establishes minimum
standard).
61. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 537-40
(1979) (history of Social Security Act clearly indicates Congress intended states to have broad
freedom in establishing type of unemployment insurance system each state desired); supra notes
26-31 and accompanying text (discussion of New York Telephone); see also Report of the
Committee on Economic Security, supra note 3, at 1326 (Committee contemplated states would
have broad discretion to establish type of program each state desired).
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